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Abstract
We introduce a new inner model C(aa) arising from stationary logic.
We show that assuming a proper class of Woodin cardinals, or alternatively
MM++, the regular uncountable cardinals of V are measurable in the inner
model C(aa), the theory of C(aa) is (set) forcing absolute, and C(aa) sat-
isfies CH. We introduce an auxiliary concept that we call club determinacy,
which simplifies the construction of C(aa) greatly but may have also inde-
pendent interest. Based on club determinacy, we introduce the concept of
aa-mouse which we use to prove CH and other properties of the inner model
C(aa).
1 Introduction
This is the second part of a two-part paper on inner models obtained by means of
extended logics. A generally acknowledged weakness of Go¨del’s in many ways
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robust inner model L is that it cannot support large cardinals, beyond such “small”
large cardinals as inaccessible, Mahlo, and weakly compact cardinals. In the so-
called Inner Model Program inner models are built for bigger and bigger large
cardinals, reaching currently as far as a Woodin limit of Woodin cardinals. These
models resemble Go¨del’s L in that deep fine-structure can be established for them
leading, among other things, to canonical proofs of CH, ✸, ✷, etc. in those
inner models. While these so-called fine-structural inner models are extremely
useful in almost all areas of modern set theory, it cannot be denied that they are
built somewhat “opportunistically”, by assuming a large cardinal and building a
carefully crafted model around it. With our new inner models we look for a more
canonical inner model construction which would still have desirable properties.
But what should one expect from a canonical inner model? First of all we
propose that we should expect robustness. We have in mind three meanings of
robustness: (1) Stability of the model under changes in the definition (in the fixed
universe of set theory). (2) Robustness across universes of set theory, stability
under forcing extensions. (3) The theory of the model (or an important part of
it) should be invariant under forcing extensions. A second quality we propose to
expect from a canonical inner model is completeness in the sense that canonical
definable objects should be included. A litmus test of this would be closure under
sharps or other canonical operations.
The first part [7] of this two-part paper dealt mainly with some general ques-
tions concerning inner models obtained from extended logics, and more specifi-
cally the inner model C∗ defined by means of the cofinality quantifier [12]. In this
second part we focus on the a priori bigger inner model C(aa) defined by means
of the stationary logic [1]. Note that
L ⊆ C∗ ⊆ C(aa) ⊆ HOD. (1)
The main results about C∗ in [7] were that under the assumption of a proper
class of Woodin cardinals, the theory of C∗ is set forcing absolute, uncountable
cardinals > ω1 of V are weakly compact in C
∗ (and ω1 is Mahlo), and the theory
of C∗ is independent of the cofinality used. Moreover, C∗ is closed under sharps.
We were not able to solve the problem of CH inC∗ although we showed, assuming
three Woodin cardinals and a measurable above them, that for a cone of reals r
the relativized inner model C∗[r] satisfies CH.
Here we show that if there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals, then uncount-
able cardinals of V are measurable in C(aa), and the theory of the model C(aa)
is invariant under set forcing. This raises naturally the question of the truth-value
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of CH in C(aa). We show, assuming a proper class of Woodin cardinals, or al-
ternatively MM++, that C(aa) satisfies CH. Again, we point out that C(aa) is
closed under sharps. We also consider some variants of C(aa).
The models C∗ and C(aa) arise from general considerations involving such
basic set-theoretical concepts as cofinality and stationarity. It is quite remarkable
that we can achieve the level of robustness that these models manifest. It should
come as no news that we have to make set-theoretical assumptions before we can
obtain robustness results for C∗ and C(aa). For example, if V = L, then both
models are simply identical toL. Our assumptions are either large cardinal axioms
or forcing axioms.
There are two new tools that we develop for the proofs of the results men-
tioned. The first tool is club determinacywhich simplifies stationary logic consid-
erably in our construction. Roughly speaking, club determinacy says that every
stationary definable set of countable subsets ofC(aa) contains a club. The second
tool is the concept of an aa-mouse. Roughly speaking, an aa-mouse consists of
a transitive set together with a theory formulated in stationary logic. Intuitively
speaking, the transitive set satisfies the theory-part, but this is not true in general.
For example, it is not true if the transitive set is countable. The major part of this
paper is devoted to proving club determinacy under large cardinal assumptions, or
MM++, and to developing the theory of aa-mice and, what we call, aa-ultrapowers
of aa-mice.
We feel that there are a wealth of questions worth studying about the new inner
models. At the end of the paper we list some such questions.
Notation: If κ is a cardinal and M a set, we denote the set of subsets M of
cardinality< κ by Pκ(M). We use bold face a, b,x etc for finite sequences. ∀xϕ
is short for ∀x1 . . .∀xnϕ and aasϕ is short for aas1 . . .aasnϕ. If h is a function
and x ⊆ dom(f), then we use h[x] to denote the set {h(y) : y ∈ x}. H(µ) is the
set of sets of hereditary cardinality less than µ.
2 Basic concepts
Let us recall that a set S of countable subsets of a set M is said to be closed
unbounded (club) if for every countable s ⊆ M there is s′ ∈ S such that s ⊆ s′,
and for every {sn : n < ω} ⊆ S such that ∀n(sn ⊆ sn+1) the set
⋃
n sn is in S, or
equivalently, S is the set of countable subsets of M closed under a countable set
of functions. The set S is stationary if it meets every club set of countable subsets
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ofM . Stationary logic is the extension of first order logic by the following second
order quantifier:
Definition 2.1. If a is a finite sequence of elements ofM and t is a finite sequence
of countable subsets ofM , then we define
M |= aasϕ(s, t,a)
if and only if {A ∈ Pω1(M) : M |= ϕ(A, t,a)} contains a club of countable
subsets ofM . We denote ¬aas¬ϕ by statsϕ. The extension of first order logic
by the quantifier aa is denoted L(aa).
This quantifier was introduced in [12] and studied extensively in [1]. The idea
is that rather than asking whether there is some countable setA satisfyingϕ(A), or
whether all countable sets A satisfy ϕ(A), we ask whether most A satisfy ϕ(A).
The second order “some/all” quantifiers are generally believed to be too strong to
give rise to interesting model theory, but the “most” quantifier has turned out to
be better behaved. There is a complete axiomatization, a Compactness Theorem
in countable vocabularies, and a Downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem down
to ℵ1 for countable theories (i.e. every countable consistent theory has a model of
cardinality ℵ1).
Some examples of the expressive power of stationary logic are the following:
We can express “ϕ(·) is countable” with aas∀y(ϕ(y) → s(y)). If we have a
linear order ϕ(·, ·), we can express the proposition that it has cofinality ω with
aas∀x∃y(ϕ(x, y) ∧ s(y)). We can express the proposition that ϕ(·, ·) is ℵ1-like
with ∀xaas∀y(ϕ(y, x) → s(y)). The set {α < κ : cf(α) = ω} is L(aa)-
definable on (κ,<) by means of aas(sup(s) = α). The property of a set A ⊆
{α < κ : cf(α) = ω} of being stationary is definable in L(aa) by means
of stats(sup(s) ∈ A). Finally, we can express the proposition that an ℵ1-like
linear order ϕ(·, ·) contains a closed unbounded subset (i.e. a copy of ω1) with
aas(sup(s) ∈ dom(ϕ)).
The axioms of the logic L(aa) are [1]:
(A0) aasϕ(s)↔ aatϕ(t)
(A1) ¬aas(⊥)
(A2) aas(x ∈ s), aat(s ⊆ t)
(A3) (aasϕ ∧ aasψ)→ aas(ϕ ∧ ψ)
(A4) aas(ϕ→ ψ)→ (aasϕ→ aasψ)
(A5) ∀xaasϕ(x, s)→ aas∀x ∈ sϕ(x, s).


(2)
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These are complete in the sense that any countable L(aa)-theory consistent with
them has a model of cardinality ℵ1. Intuitively, (A1) says that ∅ is not club. (A2)
says that the set of countable sets having a fixed element as an element, as well
as the set of countable sets containing a fixed countable set as a subset, are club.
(A3) and (A4) simply say that the club-filter (of definable sets) is a filter. Finally
(A5) is a formulation of Fodor’s Lemma.
SupposeA is a stationary subset of a regular κ > ω such that ∀α ∈ A(cf(α) =
ω). The ω-club filter Fω(A) is the set of subsets of A which contain a club of
subsets ofA. Note thatFω(A) is<κ-closed. The property ofB ⊆ κ of belonging
toFω(A) is definable fromA inL(aa) by means of aas(sup(s) ∈ A→ sup(s) ∈
B).
More generally, if δ is an uncountable cardinal such that δ = δ<δ, we consider
the quantifier aaδ with the followingmeaning: Ifa is a finite sequence of elements
ofM and t is a finite sequence of subsets ofM of cardinality < δ, then we define
M |= aasϕ(s, t,a)
if and only if {s ∈ Pδ(M) : M |= ϕ(s, t,a)} contains a club of subsets ofM of
cardinality < δ. It is proved in [11] that a sentence of L(aa) has a model if and
only if it has a model when aa is interpreted as aaδ.
3 Inner model C(aa)
Following the idea pursued in [7], we introduce a new inner model C(aa) ob-
tained in the same way as Go¨del’s constructible hierarchy L, but replacing in the
definition first order logic by the logic L(aa). The general construction is as
follows:
Definition 3.1. [7] Suppose L∗ is a logic. IfM is a set, let DefL∗(M) denote the
set of all sets of the form X = {a ∈ M : (M,∈) |= ϕ(a, b)}, where ϕ(x,y) is
an arbitrary formula of the logic L∗ and b ∈ M . We define the hierarchy (L′α) of
sets constructible using L∗ as follows:
L′0 = ∅
L′α+1 = DefL∗(L
′
α)
L′ν =
⋃
α<ν L
′
α for limit ν.
We use C(L∗) to denote the class
⋃
α L
′
α.
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In the special case that L∗ is L(aa), we denote C(L(aa)) by
C(aa).
We also consider the inner model C(aaδ) i.eC(L(aaδ)). Since the quantifierQcfω ,
which gives rise to the inner model C∗ (= C(L(Qcfω ))) is definable in L(aa), we
have the trivial relations of (1).
Lemma 3.2. C(aa) is a model of ZFC.
Proof. The claim follows from the general results of [7].
In the course of this paper we will see that C(aa) is in many ways a fairly
robust inner model, at least if there are big enough large cardinals.
It is important to keep in mind that the quantifier aas in the construction of
C(aa) asks whether there is a club in V of countable sets s in V with some
property. Thus, although we obtain an inner model C(aa), we let the quantifier
aa “reach out” to V . Thus C(aa) knows certain facts about V but it may not be
able to have witnesses to corroborate those facts. The whole point of using L(aa)
in the definition of C(aa) is that L(aa) provides some information about V but
not too much.
The countable levels L′α, α < ω1, bring nothing new. They are the same as the
respective levels of the constructible hierarchy, as the aa-quantifier is eliminable
in countable models.
Note that S = {α < κ : cfV (α) = ω} ∈ C(aa). The property of A ⊆ S
of being stationary (in V ) is definable in C(aa), as is the property of containing
a club. Thus, if A ∈ C(aa), then the “trace” of the ω-club filter of V on A,
namely (Fω(A))V ∩ C(aa), is in C(aa). One of the main results of this paper is
that (Fω(κ))V ∩ C(aa) is a normal ultrafilter on κ, whenever κ > ω is regular,
assuming large cardinals.
Many natural questions about C(aa) immediately suggest themselves:
• Does it satisfy CH?
• Does it have large cardinals?
• How absolute is it?
• Is its theory forcing absolute?
• How is it related to other known inner models such as L, HOD, etc?
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We will provide some answers in this paper but many natural questions remain
also unanswered. We shall prove C(aa) |= CH from large cardinal assumptions,
but let us immediately observe that ZFC alone does not limit the cardinality of the
continuum in C(aa) to neither ℵ1 nor to ≤ ℵ2. This is in sharp contrast to the
case of C∗ (see [7]) where the continuum is always ≤ ℵ2 of V . Below ℵ3 refers
to ℵ3 of V .
Theorem 3.3. Con(ZF ) implies Con(|R ∩ C(aa)| ≥ ℵ3).
Proof. Assume V = L. Let S ⊆ ω3 be a non-reflecting stationary set of ordinals
of cofinality ω with fat (i.e. for every club C ⊆ ω3, S ∩ C contains closed sets
of ordinals of arbitrarily large order types below ω3) complement, consisting of
ordinals of cofinality ω. Let Sα, α < ω3, be a partitioning of S into disjoint
stationary sets. Let us now work in a generic extension obtained by adding Cohen
reals rα, α < ω3. The sets Sα are still stationary, because the forcing is CCC. Let
A be the set {ω · α + n : n ∈ rα, α < ω3}. Let E be the union of the sets Sα,
where α ∈ A. Let us move to a forcing extension obtained by forcing a club D
through the fat stationary set ω3 \ E. This forcing does not add bounded subsets
of ω3, whence ω3 does not change. If α ∈ A, then Sα ∩D = ∅ and Sα is therefore
non-stationary after the forcing. On the other hand, If α /∈ A, then Sα ∩ E = ∅
and shooting a club through ω3 \ E preserves the stationarity of Sα. Hence for
any α ∈ ω3, α ∈ A if and only if Sα is non-stationary. Hence A ∈ C(aa).
Now rα = {n : ω · α + n ∈ A}. Hence each rα is in C(aa), and therefore
|R ∩ C(aa)| ≥ ℵ3.
The role of ℵ3 in the above theorem is not crucial, but just an example. It can
be replaced by any cardinal. Since ZFC ⊢ |R ∩ C∗| ≤ ℵ2 [7], we obtain:
Corollary 3.4. Con(ZF ) implies Con(C∗ 6= C(aa)).
We do not know whether sufficiently large cardinals imply C∗ 6= C(aa), but
it seems like a natural conjecture.
We can use the proof of Theorem 3.3 to prove the consistency of the non-
absoluteness of C(aa) in the sense that inside C(aa) the C(aa) may look differ-
ent than from outside:
Proposition 3.5. Con(ZF ) implies Con(C(aa)C(aa) 6= C(aa)).
Proof. We proceed as in the proof of Theorem 3.3. Assume V = L. Let Sn,
n < ω, be a partitioning of ω1 into disjoint stationary sets. Let us then work
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in a generic extension obtained by adding a Cohen real r. The sets Sα are still
stationary. Let E be the union of Sn, where n ∈ r. Let us move to a forcing
extension V [G] obtained by forcing a club D through the stationary set ω1 \ E.
Now n ∈ r if and only if Sn is non-stationary. Hence r ∈ C(aa), whence L(r) ⊆
C(aa) and C(aa) 6= L. One can prove by induction on the construction (L′α) of
C(aa) in V [G] that a subset S ∈ L(r) of ω1 is stationary in V [G] if and only if it
is included (up to a non-stationary set) in some Sn, n /∈ r. Hence C(aa) ⊆ L(r),
and, in consequence, we obtain C(aa) = L(r). But C(aa)L(r) = L. Hence
V [G] |= C(aa)C(aa) 6= C(aa).
If x ∈ C(aa) and x# exists, then x# ∈ C(aa). This is proved as for C∗ in [7].
If Lµ exists, then Lν ⊆ C∗ for some ν, and hence Lν ⊆ C(aa) for some ν. We
do not know whether Lµ, where µ is a measure on the smallest possible ordinal,
is contained in C(aa).
4 Club determinacy
We introduce the useful auxiliary concept of club determinacy and show that
C(aa) satisfies it, assuming large cardinals or MM++. Roughly speaking, club
determinacy says that definable sets of ordinals of cofinality ω in C(aa) either
contain a club or their complement contains a club. This simplifies the structure
of C(aa) as we do not have any definable stationary co-stationary sets. The main
results of the later sections are heavily based on this.
Definition 4.1 ([3]). A first order structureM is club determined if
M |= ∀x[aasϕ(x, s, t) ∨ aas¬ϕ(x, s, t)],
where ϕ(x, s, t) is any formula in L(aa) and t is a finite sequence of countable
subsets ofM .
On a club determined structure the quantifier stat (“stationarily many”) and
aa (“club many”) coincide on definable sets. The truth of aasϕ(s, b) in a structure
M can be written in the form of a two-person perfect information zero-sum game
G(ϕ,M, b): the players alternate to pick elements a0, a1, . . . from M . After ω
moves Player II wins if s = {a0, a1, . . .} satisfies ϕ(s, b) inM. A structureM is
club determined if and only if the gameG(ϕ,M, b) is determined for all formulas
ϕ and all parameters b. Hence the name.
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There are several results in [3] suggesting that club determined structures have
a ‘better’ model theory than arbitrary structures1. For a start, every consistent
first order theory has a club determined model. Moreover, every club determined
uncountable model has an L(aa)-elementary submodel of cardinality ℵ1, while
for arbitrary structures this cannot be proved in ZFC. It fails if V = L ([2]), but
holds if we assume PFA++ (see Theorem 4.17 below).
Lemma 4.2. If a first order structureM is club determined, then
M |= ∀x[aasϕ(x, s, t) ∨ aas¬ϕ(x, s, t)], (3)
where ϕ(x, s, t) is any formula in L(aa) and t is a finite sequence of countable
subsets ofM .
Proof. Suppose ϕ(x, s1, . . . , sn, t) is a formula in L(aa), t is a finite sequence
of countable subsets of M , and x is a finite sequence of elements of M . We use
induction on n. If n = 1, the claim is true by assumption. Suppose then n > 1
andM |= ¬aas1aas2 . . .aasnϕ(x, s1, . . . , sn, t). By the assumption (3),
M |= aas1¬aas2 . . .aasnϕ(x, s1, . . . , sn, t),
whence by the Induction Hypothesis,
M |= aas1aas2 . . .aasn¬ϕ(x, s1, . . . , sn, t).
Definition 4.3. We say that the inner model C(aa) is club determined, or that
club determinacy holds, if every level (L′α,∈) in the construction of C(aa) is
club determined as a first order structure.
Intuitively speaking, ifC(aa) is club determined, its definition is more robust—
the quantifier aa is more lax than it would be otherwise, and in consequence,
C(aa) is a little easier to compute.
We consider club determinacy also with the quantifier aa interpreted as aaδ.
We say that (N,∈) satisfies δ-club determinacy if it satisfies club determinacy
with aa replaced by aaδ.
The main technical result of this paper is says that if there are a proper class of
Woodin cardinals, then C(aa) is club determined (Theorem 4.12). We prove the
1In [3] the name “finitely determinate” is used.
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same conclusion also under the alternative assumption of MM++ (Theorem 4.20).
In view of Theorem 5.1 below some large cardinal (in V or in an inner model)
assumption is necessary for club determinacy. Of course, a proper class of mea-
surable cardinals is a much weaker assumption than a proper class of Woodin
cardinals, and we do not know the exact large cardinal assumption needed here.
4.1 Club determinacy fromWoodin cardinals
We are going to prove club determinacy in two cases. The first case is a proper
class of Woodin cardinals. This will be the topic of the current section. In the
next section we use the assumption MM++. MM++ is consistent relative to a
supercompact cardinal [4] and implies the consistency of a proper class of Woodin
cardinals.
Suppose δ is a Woodin cardinal. We use P<δ to denote the stationary tower
forcing at δ and Q<δ to denote the corresponding countable stationary tower forc-
ing. For details concerning the stationary tower we refer to [8].
Here is a sketch of the proof of club determinacy. We look at the earliest stage
at which club determinacy fails for C(aa). Let us suppose it fails because a set
S = {s ∈ Pω1(L
′
α) : L
′
α |= ϕ(a, s, t)} (4)
is stationary co-stationary, where a is a finite sequence of elements ofL′α and t is a
finite sequence of countable subsets of L′α. We may assume that α and ϕ(s,x) are
minimal for which this happens. We show with a separate argument that we can
assume w.l.o.g. that |α| = ℵ1 and δ12 = ω2. Let now δ be a Woodin cardinal. We
force withQ<δ and obtain the associated generic embedding j : V →M ⊆ V [G].
InM the set j(S) is the set of s ∈ Pω1(L
′
α) such thatL
′
β |= ϕ(j(a), s, j(t)), where
β = j(α). We use the minimality of α and ϕ to argue that (L′β)
M is the β th level,
which we denote L∗β, of the hierarchy of C(aaδ) in V . We also show that j(a) is
an element a∗ of V , and j(t) is an element t∗ of V . Finally, we argue that j(S)
is, up to a club, in V because it is the set of subsets, smaller than δ, of L∗β which
satisfy ϕ(a∗, s, t∗) in L∗β. This shows, essentially, that j(S) is independent of the
generic G. But we can choose the generic so that includes S or so that it includes
the complement of S, because both are stationary. In the former case ω1 ∈ j(S)
and in the latter case ω1 /∈ j(S). This contradicts the fact that j(S) is independent
of G.
The following general fact about forcing will be used below:
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Lemma 4.4. Suppose δ is a regular cardinal, P is a forcing notion such that
|P| = δ, and G is P-generic. If δ is still a regular cardinal in V [G], then for all
N ∈ V , every club of (Pδ(N))V is stationary in (Pδ(N))V [G].
Proof. Without loss of generality,N is an ordinal β. LetC be a club in (Pδ(N))V .
Suppose τ is a forcing term for an algebra on β. Let µ be a big enough regular
cardinal. We build in V a chainMα, α < δ, of elementary substructures ofH(µ)
V
of cardinality < δ in such a way that P, τ, β ∈ M0, Mα ∈ C, Mν =
⋃
α<ν Mα
for limit ν, and P ⊆
⋃
α<δMα. Let G be P-generic. Since δ is regular in V [G],
we can construct, in V [G], an ordinal γ < δ such that if D ⊆ P is a dense set in
Mγ , then D ∩ G ∩Mγ 6= ∅. NowMγ ∩ β ∈ V is closed under the value of τ in
V [G].
The main technical tool is proving the club determinacy is the following result
about preservation of stationarity in the forcing Q<λ:
Proposition 4.5. Suppose that λ is Woodin andG isQ<λ generic over V . If S ⊆ λ
and S ∈ V is stationary in V then S is stationary in V [G].
Proof. Suppose that S is not stationary in V [G]. Let τ be a Q<λ term for a club
subset of λ forced to be disjoint from S. To simplify notation we assume that the
maximal condition forces that τ ∩ S = ∅. For every α < λ let Dα be a maximal
anti-chain of conditions which force some ordinal > α in to τ . For every α < λ
let Fα be the function defined onDα such that Fα(q) is the minimal ordinal above
α which is forced into τ by q. Let N be an elementary substructure of H(κ) for a
big enough κ such that 〈Dα : α < λ〉 and other relevant elements of the proof are
inN . Also we require thatN ∩λ is an ordinal δ ∈ S and that Vδ ⊆ N . Clearly Vδ
is closed under Fα for every α < δ.
We use the following definition :
Definition 4.6. Let D be a maximal anti-chain in Qλ. We say that X ∈ Pω1(Vλ)
catchesD below ρ if there is q ∈ D ∩X ∩ Vρ such that X ∩ ∪q ∈ q.
The following definition is a modification to Q<λ of definition 2.5.1 of [8].
Definition 4.7. LetD be a maximal anti-chain inQ<λ. We say thatD is semiproper
at ρ if for everyX ≺ Vρ+2, X countable, there is a countable Y ≺ Vρ+2 such that
Y catchesD below ρ and Y end extendsX below ρ (i.e. if α ∈ (Y −X)∩ ρ then
α ≥ sup(X ∩ ρ)).
The following fact follows immediately from the modification to Q<λ of the-
orem 2.5.9 of [8]:
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Claim. For every Dα there are unboundedly many inaccessible cardinals γ < λ
such that Dα is semiproper at γ.
By N ≺ H(κ) and N ∩ λ = δ it follows that for every α < δ, there are
unboundedly many γ < δ such that Dα is semiproper at γ.
In the following arguments we assume that Vδ+2 is also endowed with a fixed
well order.
Lemma 4.8. For every countableX ≺ Vδ+2 such that 〈Dα : α < δ〉 ∈ X there is
a countable Y ≺ Vδ+2 such that X ⊆ Y and for every α ∈ Y ∩ δ, Y catches Dα
below δ.
Proof. We define by induction an increasing sequence 〈Xn : n < ω〉 of countable
elementary substructures of Vδ+2 where X0 = X , a sequence 〈αn : n < ω〉 of
ordinals less than δ such that αn ∈ Xn, and an increasing sequence 〈γn : n < ω〉,
γn ∈ Xn, such that Dαn is semiproper at γn. By dovetailing we make sure that
for every n < ω and α ∈ Xn ∩ δ there is k such that α = αk. Also we keep
the inductive assumption that Xn+1 catches Dαn below γn and that it is an end
extension of Xn below γn. So it follows that Xn+1 continues to catch Dαk below
γk for all k < n.
GivenXn. Pick αn ∈ Xn so as to continue our dovetailing process. Let γn be
an element of Xn above γn−1 such that Dαn is semiproper at γn. Such a γn exists
inXn sinceXn is an elementary substructure of Vδ+2 andDαn ∈ Xn. (Recall that
〈Dα : α < λ〉 ∈ X ⊆ Xn.)
Since Xn ≺ Vδ+2, we have R = Xn ∩ Vγn+2 ≺ Vγn+2, hence there is a
countable Z ≺ Vγn+2 such that R ⊆ Z, Z is an end extension of R below γn, and
Z catches Dαn below γn. We define Xn+1 to be all the elements of Vδ+2 which
are definable in Vδ+2 from Xn ∪ Z. Clearly Xn+1 ≺ Vδ+2.
Claim. Xn+1 ∩ Vγn = Z ∩ Vγn .
Proof. Clearly Z ∩Vγn ⊆ Xn+1∩Vγn . For the other direction let a ∈ Xn+1∩Vγn .
Then a is definable from some elements ~b of Xn and an element c of Z by a
formula ϕ(x,~b, c). (It is enough to consider a single element c of Z, since Z
is closed under forming finite sequences.) Consider the following function h :
Vγn → Vγn . We let h(y) to be the unique element d of Vγn satisfying ϕ(d,~b, y) if
there is such a unique element, and 0 otherwise. Now h ∈ Vδ+2 and h is definable
in Vδ+2 from ~b. Moreover, it is a function from Vγn to Vγn . So h ∈ Xn ∩ Vγn+2.
So h ∈ Z. Clearly a = h(c). Hence a = h(c) ∈ Z.
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Continuing the proof of Lemma 4.8, it follows from the claim that Xn+1 end
extendsXn below γn and catches Dαn From our inductive assumptions it follows
that Xn+1 catches Dαk below γk for all k ≤ n. Now, if we define Y = ∪nXn,
then Y satisfies the requirements of the lemma.
We continue the proof of Proposition 4.5 with the following:
Claim. The set
T = {X ∈ Pω1(Vδ+1) : X ≺ Vδ+1, X catches Dα below δ for every
α ∈ X ∩ δ.}
(5)
is stationary on Pω1(Vδ+1).
Proof. Assume otherwise, then there is a function g : Vδ+1 → Vδ+1 such that
every countable X ⊆ Vδ+1 which is closed under g is not in T . F can be coded
as an element of Vδ+2. (We use g also for the code in Vδ+2.) Let X be a countable
elementary substructure of Vδ+2 containing g and the sequences 〈Dα∩Vδ : α < δ〉.
By the above lemma, there is a countableX ⊆ Y ≺ Vδ+2 such that Y catches Dα
below δ for every α ∈ Y . It is obvious that Y ∩ Vδ+1 ∈ T , but g ∈ Y so Y ∩ Vδ+1
is closed under the function g, which is a contradiction.
We can now finish the proof of Proposition 4.5. By the above claim T ∈ Q<λ.
We claim that T  δ ∈ τ . Suppose that T ′ ≤ T such that T ′ forces that α < δ is a
bound for τ ∩ λ. We can assume without loss of generality that for every Z ∈ T ′
α ∈ Z. Since T ′ ≤ T we can also assume that every Z ∈ T ′ catches Dα below δ.
For Z ∈ T ′ let G(Z) ∈ Z ∩ Dα witness the fact that Z catches Dα. By Fodor’s
lemma there is q ∈ Dα such that the set T ′′ = {Z ∈ T ′ : G(Z) = q} is stationary
in ∪T ′. But T ′′ forces T ′′ ≤ q. But q forces some ordinal above α to be in τ ∩ δ.
We have a contradiction.
Proposition 4.9. For every set A in V , if S ⊆ Pδ(A) is stationary in V , then it is
stationary in V [G].
Proof. This is proved as Proposition 4.5.
Let (L′α) be the hierarchy of C(aa) in V . Let (L
∗
α) be the hierarchy of C(aaδ)
in V . We will compare these two inner models, or rather C(aaδ) and the image of
C(aa) under a generic ultrapower embedding. We use A |=δ ϕ to denote A |= ϕ
when we think of ϕ as a sentence of L(aaδ) rather than of L(aa).
Suppose now δ is a Woodin cardinal. LetG beQ<δ-generic and j : V → M ⊆
V [G] the generic ultrapower embedding. Let (L′′α) be the hierarchy of C(aa) in
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M . As a part of the proof that C(aa) satisfies club determinacy we show that
C(aa) of M is actually C(aaδ) of V (see Proposition 5.2). We show this by a
level by level analysis of the two aa-hierarchies (L′′α) and (L
∗
α).
In the subsequent proofs we will use parameters from V although we are deal-
ing also with M . The lemma below shows that while j is certainly not definable
in V , it maps relevant parameters to V . First we need an auxiliary result. The
following result is a widely known folklore result, but we include a sketch of the
proof for the reader’s convenience:
Lemma 4.10. Assume x# exists for every x ⊆ ω. Then
δ12 = sup{((ℵ
V
1 )
+)L[x] : x ⊆ ω}. (6)
Proof. Kunen’s proof of the result of Martin ([9]) to the effect that every well
founded Σ12 relation has rank < ω2, shows that the rank is actually less than
((ℵV1 )
+)L[x], where x is the real parameter of the Σ12-definition. This gives one
direction of (6). For the other direction, suppose x is a real and η = ((ℵV1 )
+)L[x].
Every ordinal less than η is definable in L[x] from some x-indiscernibles ≤ ℵV1 .
This gives the other direction and finishes the proof of (6). We can define a re-
lation between n-tuples of reals coding the indiscernibles and the formula. This
relation is∆12 using x
# as a parameter. The rank of the relation is η and therefore
η < δ12 .
Lemma 4.11. Assume δ12 = ω2 and δ is a Woodin cardinal. Then j↾ω2 ∈ V . In
particular, if s is a countable subset of ω2, then j(s) ∈ V . Moreover, there is
t ∈ V such that Q<δ j(sˇ) = tˇ.
Proof. Let, by Lemma 4.10, g ∈ V be a function on ω2 such that for all α < ω2,
g(α) is a subset of ω such that α < ((ℵV1 )
+)L[g(α)]. Let f(α) ∈ L[g(α)] be a
one-one function α → ℵV1 . Now j(f(α)) ∈ L[j(g(α))] = L[g(α)] and therefore
j(f(α)) ∈ V . To see that j↾ω2 ∈ V it suffices to note that we can compute it in
V :
j↾ω2 =
⋃
α<ω2
j↾f(α)−1[ℵV1 ]) = j(f(α))
−1↾j(ℵV1 ) = j(f(α))
−1↾δ.
Thus j↾ω2 ∈ V .
Theorem 4.12. If there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals, then C(aa) is club
determined.
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Proof. Suppose α is the smallest ordinal for which L′α fails to satisfy club deter-
minay. We can collapse |α| to ℵ1 without changingC(aa). Hence we may assume
w.l.o.g. |α| = ℵ1. By a result of Shelah we can, starting from a Woodin cardinal,
force the ω2-saturation of the non-stationary ideal on ω1 with semi-proper forcing.
This forcing does not change C(aa) up to the level α + 1. Since we have also a
measurable cardinal, we may conclude that δ12 = ω2 ([15, Theorem 3.17]). Hence
we may assume, w.l.o.g. δ12 = ω2. By Lemma 4.10 there is a real x and f ∈ L[x]
such that f : L′α → ω
V
1 is a bijection. Suppose f is the least in the canonical
well-order of L[x]. Let δ > α be a Woodin cardinal and j : V → M ⊆ V [G] as
above. Let β = j(α). Now g = j(f) : L′′β → δ is a bijection and the L[x]-least
such. Hence g ∈ V .
Suppose ϕ witnesses the failure of club determinacy at L′α, i.e. there is a set
P = {s ∈ Pω1(L
′
α) : L
′
α |= ϕ(a, s, t)},
where a ∈ L′α and t is a countable subset of L
′
α, which is stationary co-stationary.
We may assume that ϕ is minimal for such a counter-example to exists.
By the elementarity of j, j(P ) is a counter-example to club determinacy of L′′β
inM in the sense that
j(P ) = {s ∈ (Pδ(L
′′
β))
M : (L′′β |= ϕ(j(a), s, j(t)))
M}
is stationary co-stationary inM . Moreover, β is minimal for this to happen inM
and ϕ is minimal for this to happen at L′′β inM .
Let us say that L∗ξ satisfies weak δ-club determinacy if it satisfies club deter-
minacy with the restriction that the parameters (t in Definition 4.1) have to be in
M .
Lemma 4.13. L∗β = L
′′
β and weak δ-club determinacy holds for L
∗
β in V .
Proof. We use induction on γ ≤ β to prove the following claim:
Claim. L∗γ = L
′′
γ and weak δ-club determinacy holds for L
∗
γ in V .
Let us suppose the claim holds for (and below) γ. We prove the claim for γ+1.
Let N = L∗γ = L
′′
γ . Thus N ∈ V ∩M . Moreover, club determinacy holds for N
in M and weak δ-club determinacy holds for N in V . We show by induction on
ψ ∈ L(aa) that for finite sequences x in N :
{a ∈ N : (N |=δ ψ(x, a))
V } = {a ∈ N : (N |= ψ(x, a))M}.
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This will imply L∗γ+1 = L
′′
γ+1. It suffices to prove the induction step for the
aa-quantifier i.e. that for all x in N and all finite sequences t in (Pδ(N))V ∩
(Pω1(N))
M the equality A = B holds, where
A = {a ∈ N : (N |=δ aasθ(x, s, t, a))V }
B = {a ∈ N : (N |= aasθ(x, s, t, a))M},
assuming we know for all s in (Pδ(N))V ∩ (Pω1(N))
M :
{a ∈ N : (N |=δ θ(x, s, t, a))V } = {a ∈ N : (N |= θ(x, s, t, a))M}. (7)
Suppose a ∈ A i.e.
V |= “{s ∈ Pδ(N) : N |=δ θ(x, s, t, a)} contains a club H”.
If a /∈ B, then since club determinacy holds for N inM ,
M |= “{s ∈ Pω1(N) : N |= θ(x, s, t, a)} is disjoint from a club K”.
The set K is still a club in V [G], as Mω ⊆ M . By Lemma 4.4 H is stationary
in V [G]. Therefore there is some s in K ∩ H . Note that s ∈ M ∩ V . Then on
the one hand V |= “N |=δ θ(x, s, t, a)”, since s ∈ H , and on the other hand
M |= “N 6|= θ(x, s, t, a)”, since s ∈ K, contrary to (7).
For the converse, suppose a ∈ B i.e.
M |= “{s ∈ Pω1(N) : N |= θ(x, s, t, a)} contains a clubK”.
The set K is still a club in V [G], as Mω ⊆ M . If a /∈ A, then by weak δ-club
determinacy of N in V ,
V |= “{s ∈ Pδ(N) : N |=δ θ(x, s, t, a)} is disjoint from a clubH”.
By Lemma 4.4 H is stationary in V [G]. Therefore there is some s in H ∩ K.
Note that s ∈ M ∩ V . Then on the one hand V |= “N 6|=δ θ(x, s, t, a)”, since
s ∈ H , and on the other handM |= “N |= θ(x, s, t, a)”, since s ∈ K. We have a
contradiction with (7).
This ends the proof that L∗γ+1 = L
′′
γ+1. Now we prove weak δ-club determi-
nacy for L∗γ+1. Suppose
S = {s ∈ Pδ(L
∗
γ+1) : L
∗
γ+1 |=δ θ(x, s, t, a)},
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where x ∈ L∗γ+1 and t ∈ Pδ(L
∗
γ+1)∩M , is stationary co-stationary in V . A proof
similar to the proof of L∗γ+1 = L
′′
γ+1 above shows that
S ∩ (Pω1(L
′′
γ+1))
M = T, (8)
where
T = {s ∈ (Pω1(L
′′
γ+1))
M : (L′′γ+1 |=δ θ(x, s, t, a))
M}.
By Proposition 4.9 S is stationary co-stationary in V [G]. Recall that L′′γ+1 satisfies
club determinacy inM . By club determinacy either T or Pω1(L
′′
γ+1) \ T contains
a club inM . Suppose T contains a clubK. NowK is a club also in V [G], whence
there is s ∈ K \S. Now s ∈ K and s ∈ (Pω1(L
′′
γ+1))
M but s /∈ S, a contradiction
with (8). If Pω1(L
′′
γ+1)\T contains a club, we get a contradiction in the same way.
For limit ν ≤ β the proof of L∗ν = L
′′
ν and of weak δ-determinacy of L
∗
ν
follows from the above proof.
Since j(a) ∈ L′′β = L
∗
β , j(a) ∈ V ∩M and, moreover, there is c ∈ V ∩M
such that Q<δ j(aˇ) = cˇ. By Lemma 4.11, j(t) ∈ V ∩M and there is u ∈ V ∩M
such that Q<δ j(tˇ) = uˇ.
Lemma 4.14. For s ∈ Pδ(L∗β) ∩M:
(L′′β |= ϕ(c, s, u))
M ⇐⇒ L∗β |=δ ϕ(c, s, u).
Proof. As Lemma 4.13.
Let us denote
Q = {s ∈ Pδ(L
∗
β) : L
∗
β |=δ ϕ(c, s, u)}.
Note that Q is defined in V from parameters in V and therefore Q is in V . Now
Lemma 4.14 implies Q = j(P ). Let S ∈ V be the stationary co-stationary set
{γ < ω1 : f−1[γ] ∈ P}. It follows from g ∈ V that j(S) ∈ V and, moreover,
there is T ∈ V such that Q<δ j(Sˇ) = Tˇ .
Let G1 be Q<δ-generic, and j1 the associated embedding, such that S ∈ G1.
Let G2 be Q<δ-generic, and j2 the associated embedding, such that ω1 \ S ∈ G2.
Then ω1 ∈ j1(S) = T and ω1 /∈ j2(S) = T , a contradiction.
Corollary 4.15. Suppose there is a supercompact cardinal. Then club determi-
nacy holds.
Proof. Suppose κ is supercompact. Let α be the least such that L′α is not club
determined. Since Vκ ≺2 V , we can assume α < κ. Since κ is a Woodin cardinal,
we can proceed as above.
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4.2 Club determinacy fromMM++
The proof of club determinacy from MM++ can be proved following the same
pattern as above from a proper class of Woodin cardinals. However, there is also
a ‘soft’ argument which allows us to use the derivation of club determinacy from
a proper class of Woodin cardinals, to make the same conclusion from MM++.
Let us recall:
Definition 4.16. Martin’s Maximum++ (MM++) is the statement that for every
stationary set preserving forcing P, any sequence 〈Dα : α < ω1〉 of dense open
subsets of P and any P-terms τα, α < ω1, such that
P ⊢ τα is a stationary subset of ω1
there is a filter F ⊆ P which meets every Dα and for which each set {ξ : ∃p ∈
F (p  ξ ∈ τα)} is stationary in ω1. The ordinary Martin’s Maximum MM is
MM++ without the condition involving the terms τα. PFA
++ is the same statement
as MM++ but assuming the forcing is proper.
MM++ is consistent relative to the consistency of a supercompact cardinal [4],
and implies, among other things, that 2ℵ0 = ℵ2 and that the non-stationary ideal
on ω1 is saturated. Of course, MM
++ implies PFA++.
The following Downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem-Tarski Theorem for stationary
logic is well-known but we present a proof for the convenience of the reader. We
will use this theorem later.
Theorem 4.17 (Folklore). Assume PFA++. IfA is a model with vocabulary τ and
X ⊆ A such that |τ |+ |X| ≤ ℵ1, then there is an L(aa)-elementary submodel B
of A such that X ⊆ B and |B| ≤ ℵ1.
Proof. Let P be the usual collapsing forcing which adds a generic F : ω1 → A
by conditions which are countable partial functions ω1 → A. The forcing P is
countably closed and therefore proper. Moreover,
P  “A subset S of Pω1(Aˇ) is stationary if and only if
{α < ω1 : F˙ [α] ∈ S} is stationary in ω1”.
(9)
Let D0(α) be the set of conditions p with α ∈ dom(p). For every x ∈ X , let
D1(x) be the set of conditions pwith x ∈ rng(p). Let θ
n,m
k (s1, . . . , sn, x1, . . . , xm),
where n,m, k < ω, enumerate allL(aa)-formulas with free set-variables s1, . . . , sn
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and free individual variables x1, . . . , xn. We denote δ1, . . . , δn by δ, and η1, . . . , ηn
by η.
Let D2(k, n, δ,η) be the set of conditions p such that δ,η ∈ dom(p), and
there is β ∈ dom(p) such that
p  “Aˇ |= ∃yθk(y, F˙ [δˇ1], . . . , F˙ [δˇn], F˙ (ηˇ1), . . . , F˙ (ηˇm))→
Aˇ |= θk(F˙ (βˇ), F˙ [δˇ1], . . . , F˙ [δˇn], F˙ (ηˇ1), . . . , F˙ (ηˇm))”.
Suppose p is a condition such that β, δ, η ∈ dom(p), and
p  “Aˇ |= aasθk(s, F˙ [δˇ1], . . . , F˙ [δˇn], F˙ (ηˇ1), . . . , F˙ (ηˇm)).
Then there is qp = qp(j, n, δ,η) ≤ p and a club Cp = Cp(j, n, δ,η) ⊆ ω1 (in V )
such that
qp  ∀α ∈ Cˇp(“Aˇ |= θk(F˙ [α], F˙ [δˇ1], . . . , F˙ [δˇn], F˙ (ηˇ1), . . . , F˙ (ηˇm))”). (10)
Let D3(k, n, β, δ,η) be the set of qp for p ∈ P.
The P-term σk,n,δ,η is defined as follows: Suppose p ∈ P. If
p  “A |= statsθξ(s, F˙ [δˇ1], . . . , F˙ [δˇn], F˙ (ηˇ1), . . . , F˙ (ηˇm))”,
then (recall (9)) p forces σk,n,δ,η to be a name for the set of β < ω1 such that
A |= θk(F [β], F [δ1], . . . , F [δk], F (η1), . . . , F (ηn)).
Otherwise p forces σk,n,δ,η to be ω1. Note that now every condition forces σk,n,δ,η
to be stationary.
By PFA++ there is a filter G ⊆ P such that G meets each D0(α), D1(x),
D2(k, n, δ,η) and D3(k, n, β, δ,η), where k, n,m < ω, x ∈ X , α, β, δ,η are
countable ordinals, and in addition, all the sets σGk,n,δ,η are stationary. Clearly, F
G
is a total function ω1 → A. Let B be the unique submodel of A of cardinality
≤ ℵ1 with universe F
G[ω1]. SinceGmeets the dense setsD2(k, n, δ,η), it is easy
to see that B is closed under the interpretations of the function symbols of τ and
contains interpretations of the constant symbols of τ , so B is really a submodel of
A. Moreover, since G meets each D1(x), X ⊆ B.
To show that B is an L(aa)-elementary submodel of A we use induction on
ϕ(s1, . . . , sn, t1, . . . , tm) ∈ L(aa) to prove: If δ,η < ω1, then the following are
equivalent:
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(Tr1) B |= ϕ(FG[δ1), ..., FG[δn], FG(η1), ..., FG(ηm))
(Tr2) A |= ϕ(FG[δ1), ..., FG[δn], FG(η1), ..., FG(ηm)).
The case of the existential quantifier follows from the fact that G meets the
dense set D2(k, n, δ,η) with the appropriate k. Suppose ϕ(s1, . . . , sn, t1, . . . , tm)
is the formula aasθk(s, s1, . . . , sn, t1, . . . , tm). The implication (Tr2)→(Tr1) fol-
lows from the Induction Hypothesis and the definition of D3(k, n, β, δ,η). The
implication (Tr1)→(Tr2) follows from the Induction Hypothesis and the fact that
σGr,n,δ,η is stationary, where r is such that ¬θk = θr.
Lemma 4.18. Assume MM++. Suppose α is the least α such that club determi-
nacy fails for L′α. Then |α| ≤ ℵ
V
1 .
Proof. By Theorem 4.17 there is an L(aa)-elementary submodelA of (L′α,∈) of
cardinality≤ ℵ1 containing the parameters of the failure of club determinacy. Let
(M ∈) ∼= A be the transitive collapse and γ = M ∩ On. It is easy to prove by
induction on β ≤ γ that (L′β)
M = L′β . HenceM = L
′
γ . Also, again since A is an
L(aa)-elementary submodel of (L′α,∈), club determinacy fails at L
′
γ . Hence by
the minimality of α, necessarily |α| ≤ ℵ1.
Proposition 4.19 ([6]). Assuming PFA, there is, for every set X , an inner model
with a proper class of Woodin cardinals, containingX .
Proof. We modify Theorem 0.1 of [6] as follows. Suppose X is an arbitrary set
of ordinals, e.g. X ⊆ δ. Let an X-mouse be a mouse as in [6] except that the
mouse is assumed to containX and, moreover, it is required that all the extenders
on the coherent sequence have the critical point above δ. With this modification
the proof of Theorem 0.1 in [6] gives the result that if ✷(κ) and ✷κ+ fail for
some κ > δ, then there is inner model with a proper class of Woodin cardinals
containingX .
Theorem 4.20. AssumingMM++, club determinacy holds for C(aa).
Proof. Suppose club determinacy fails at L′α and α is minimal. By Lemma 4.18,
|α| ≤ ℵ1. Let X contain everything we need for the failure of club determinacy,
e.g. X = Vω2 . By Proposition 4.19 there is an inner modelM with a proper class
of Woodin cardinals such that M contains X . By the choice of X , M fails to
satisfy club determinacy. But this contradicts Theorem 4.12.
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5 Applications of club determinacy
We give three types of applications of club determinacy. The first is the immediate
consequence that uncountable cardinals are measurable in C(aa). Our large car-
dinal assumption in the proof of club determinacy was a proper class of Woodin
cardinals, so we are far from an optimal result. Our second application is the
forcing absoluteness of the theory of C(aa). Here we assume a proper class of
Woodin cardinals and use club determinacy merely as a tool in the proof. Our
third and more substantial application is a proof of CH in C(aa), using club
determinacy.
5.1 Large cardinals
Recall that, assuming a proper class of Woodin cardinals, uncountable cardinals
are Mahlo in C∗, and even weakly compact above ℵ1. In [7] we were not able
to prove that there are measurable cardinals in C∗ under any assumption, even
consistently. For the conceivably bigger inner model C(aa) we establish now the
measurability of all uncountable regular cardinals. As it turns out, the proof is an
immediate consequence of club determinacy.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose C(aa) is club determined. Then every regular κ ≥ ℵ1 is
measurable in C(aa).
Proof. Let Faa = Fω({α < κ : cf(α) = ω}) ∩ C(aa). This is a normal filter on
κ in C(aa). Suppose X ⊆ κ is in C(aa). There is α > κ such that
X = {β < κ : L′α |= ϕ(a, b)}
for some b ∈ L′α. Since L
′
α in club determined,
L′α |= aas∃x(x = sup(s) ∧ x < κ ∧ ϕ(x, b))
or
L′α |= aas¬∃x(x = sup(s) ∧ x < κ ∧ ϕ(x, b)).
In the first case X ∈ Faa. In the second case κ \X ∈ Faa.
It remains open whether club determinacy, or some reasonable stronger as-
sumption, implies that there are higher measurable cardinals in C(aa). By Corol-
lary 5.25 below, we cannot hope to have Woodin cardinals in C(aa) as a con-
sequence of some large cardinal assumptions. It remains open what happens to
singular cardinals. Are they regular, or even large cardinals in C(aa)?
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5.2 Forcing absoluteness
The first order theory of L(R) is absolute under set forcing, assuming a proper
class of Woodin cardinals. With a stronger assumption the same is true of the
Chang model C(Lω1ω1). We can prove the absoluteness of C(aa) under set forc-
ing assuming a proper class of Woodin cardinals.
Proposition 5.2. Suppose club-determinacy holds, δ is Woodin, G ⊆ Q<δ is
generic andM is the associated generic ultrapower. Then C(aa)M = C(aaδ)
V .
Proof. We assume club determinacy. By elementarity, also C(aa)M satisfies
club determinacy. Now we show by induction on α and on the L(aa)-formula
ϕ(s, z,y) that if we denote N = (L′α)
M and assume, as part of the Induction
Hypothesis, N = (L∗α)
V , then for every b ∈ N and t ∈ Pδ(N) ∩ V ∩ M the
following are equivalent:
(A1) (N |=δ aasϕ(s, t, b))V .
(A2) (N |= aasϕ(s, t, b))M .
Suppose first (A1). Let C be a club in V of sets s ∈ Pδ(N) satisfying
(N |=δ ϕ(s, t, b))V . By the Induction Hypothesis for every s ∈ C ∩M , (N |=
ϕ(s, t, b))M . By (4.9), C is still stationary in V [G], hence C ∩M is stationary in
M . SinceM satisfies club determinacy there must be inM a club of s satisfying
(N |= ϕ(s, t, b))M , and (A2) follows.
For the other direction: suppose (A2) i.e. inM there is a club D of countable
sets s such that (N |= ϕ(s, t, b))M . Suppose that (A1) fails. Hence the set S of
s ∈ Pδ(N) in V that satisfy (N |=δ ¬ϕ(s, t, b))V is stationary in V . By (4.9) it
is stationary in V [G]. Let s ∈ D ∩ S. Now s ∈ Pδ(N) ∩ V ∩M , so we have a
contradiction with the Induction Hypothesis.
Theorem 5.3. Suppose there are a proper class of Woodin cardinals. Then the
first order theory of C(aa) is (set) forcing absolute.
Proof. Suppose P is a forcing notion and δ be a Woodin cardinal > |P|. Let
j : V → M be the associated elementary embedding. By Proposition 5.2 we can
argue
C(aa) ≡ (C(aa))M = C(aaδ).
On the other hand, let H ⊆ P be generic over V . Then δ is still Woodin in
V [H ], so we have the associated elementary embedding j′ : V [H ] → M ′. By
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Proposition 5.2 we can again argue
(C(aa))V [H] ≡ (C(aa))M
′
= (C(aaδ))
V [H].
Finally, we may observe that (C(aaδ))
V [H] = C(aaδ), since |P| < δ. Hence
(C(aa))V [H] ≡ C(aa).
5.3 The Continuum Hypothesis
The fact (Theorem 5.3) that under large cardinal hypotheses the theory of C(aa)
is forcing absolute, strongly suggest that we should be able to determine the truth
value of the Continuum Hypothesis in C(aa). Indeed, we now use club determi-
nacy to prove the Continuum Hypothesis in C(aa) (Theorem 5.23 below). The
proof uses the auxiliary concepts of an aa-mouse and an aa-ultrapower, which
have hopefully also other uses in the study of C(aa). For example we use them
below also to prove ✸ in C(aa). Our method does not seem to yield GCH in
C(aa), although we have at the moment no reason to believe that GCH would be
violated in C(aa). Our previous paper [7] gives the consistency of the failure of
CH in C∗ relative to the consistency of ZFC. This result extends to C(aa) (see
Theorem 3.3 above).
Convention: In the rest of this Section we assume club determinacy.
5.3.1 aa-premice
Our proof uses a new inner model concept which we call aa-premouse. Roughly
speaking, an aa-premouse is a pair (M,T ), where M is a model and T is an
L(aa)-theory. Here M can very well by countable and in countable domains the
aa-quantifier is eliminable, so in general we do not assume M to be a model
of T . Rather, M is a model that has potential to become a model of T . We
fulfil this potential by building an ωV1 -chain of elementary extensions of M with
the idea that in the limit the theory T is really true. For this purpose we define
an ultrapower construction—called the aa-ultrapower—for aa-premice. It allows
us to iterate a well-chosen countable aa-premouse (iterable aa-premice are called
aa-mice) to a big uncountable aa-premouse (M ′, T ′) where T ′ is actually true
in M ′. We use the concepts of aa-premouse and aa-ultrapower to prove CH in
C(aa). The proof is reminiscent of Silver’s proof of GCH in Lµ [13]. Since we
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assume club determinacy, ωV1 is actually a measurable cardinal in C(aa). Thus
from the point of view of C(aa) we start with a countable premouse and iterate
it a measurable cardinal times until we end up with a model of the size of the
measurable cardinal.
Definition 5.4. An aa-premouse is a pair (M,T ), where
1. M is a structure with some given vocabulary τ containing the binary pred-
icate symbols ∈ and ≺ as well as possibly some unary predicate symbols.
In addition we shall use constant symbols ca (not included in τ ) for a ∈M .
The interpretation of ca is a. (When no confusion arises, we use M to de-
note also the domain of the structureM)
2. T is a complete consistent (w.r.t. the axioms (2)) L(aa)-theory in the vo-
cabulary τ ∪ {ca : a ∈M}.
3. T contains the first order diagram ofM in the vocabulary τ ∪{ca : a ∈M}.
4. If ∃xϕ(x, ca1 , . . . , can) is in T , then there is a0 ∈ M such that the sentence
ϕ(ca0 , ca1 , . . . , can) is in T .
5. T contains the L(aa)-sentences
∀y(aas∃xϕ(s, x,y)→ aas∃x(ϕ(s, x,y) ∧ ∀z(z ≺ x→ ¬ϕ(s, z,y))))
for all ϕ(s, x,y) in L(aa).
Condition 5 simply says that if we can find for a club of s an x such that
ϕ(s, x,y), then for a club of s we can find a ≺-minimal x such that ϕ(s, x,y).
This assumption allows us to have, in a sense, definable Skolem-functions.
We say that the aa-premouse (M,T ) is club determined if for all L(aa)-
formulas ϕ(s,x) and all a1, . . . , an ∈M :
aasϕ(s, ca1, . . . , can) ∈ T or aas¬ϕ(s, ca1 , . . . , can) ∈ T.
Definition 5.5. Suppose (M,T ) is an aa-premouse with vocabulary τ . A mapping
π : M → M ′ is called an elementary embedding of (M,T ) into (M ′, T ′), in
symbols
π : (M,T )→ (M ′, T ′),
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if π is an elementary embedding (in the usual sense) M → M ′ ↾ τ and for all
ϕ(xa1 , . . . , xan) ∈ L(aa) with vocabulary τ and all a1, . . . , an ∈M ,
ϕ(ca1 , . . . , can) ∈ T ⇐⇒ ϕ(cπ(a1), . . . , cπ(an)) ∈ T
′.
If π is the identitymapping, we call (M,T ) an elementary substructure of (M ′, T ′)
and write (M,T ) 4 (M ′, T ′).
Example 5.6. The canonical example of an aa-premouse is the pair
N = ((L′α,∈,≺),ThL(aa)((L
′
α,∈,≺))),
where ThL(aa)((L
′
α,∈,≺)) is the set of sentences of L(aa) true in (L
′
α,∈,≺)
with constants from L′α, and ≺ is the canonical well-order of L
′
α. Note that the
aa-quantifier is interpreted in V , not in L′α. Note also that N ∈ C(aa). Since we
assume club determinacy, this aa-premouse is club determined. We obtain other
examples of aa-premice by taking elementary substructures
M = ((M,∈,≺), T ) 4 N . (11)
Since N ∈ C(aa), we can take such an M also inside C(aa), which is im-
portant for our proof of the CH in C(aa). We write N in shortened notation as
(L′α,ThL(aa)(L
′
α)) andM as (M,T ), when no confusion can arise.
Lemma 5.7. The aa-premouse (M,T ) of Example 5.6 is club determined.
Proof. The claim follows from the fact that if
aasϕ(s, ca1 , . . . , can) ∈ ThL(aa)(L
′
α),
where a1, . . . , an ∈M , then by (11), aasϕ(s, ca1, . . . , can) ∈ T.
To simplify notation we use a to denote ca1 , . . . , can . If aas∃xϕ(s, x,a) ∈ T ,
we use the term
fϕ(s,x,a)(s)
to denote the ≺-minimal x intuitively satisfying ϕ(s, x,a), i.e. we work in a
conservative extension of T , denoted also T , which contains:
aas∃xϕ(s, x,a)→ aas(ϕ(s, fϕ(s,x,a)(s),a)∧
∀z(z ≺ fϕ(s,x,a)(s)→ ¬ϕ(s, z,a))).
In particular, the sentence
aas∃xϕ(s, x,a)→ aasϕ(s, fϕ(s,x,a)(s),a)
is in T .
25
5.3.2 The aa-ultrapower
We define now what we call the aa-ultrapower (M∗, T ∗) of an aa-premouse (M ,
T ). We do not use an ultrafilter for the construction, but rather the family F of
L(aa)-definable sets which contain a club of countable subsets of M . Since we
assume club determinacy, this family behaves sufficiently like an ultrafilter. Thus,
intuitively we define
M∗ =def M
Pω1 (M)/F ,
where Pω1(M) is computed in V . However, we cannot defineM
∗ in this way, at
least if we want to buildM∗ inside C(aa). We certainly cannot count on Pω1(M)
being in C(aa), even thoughM ∈ C(aa), and even though we can define sets in
C(aa) by reference to clubs in Pω1(M).
In order to decide CH in C(aa), we want to buildM∗ in C(aa) and therefore
wemodify the usual ultraproduct construction in a special way. Instead of defining
M∗ as the set of equivalence classes of definable functions f : Pω1(M)→M , we
defineM∗ as the set of equivalence classes of L(aa)-formulas ϕ(s, x) that define
functions f : Pω1(M)→M .
Let us now go into the details. Suppose (M,T ) is an aa-premouse with
vocabulary τ . Let M ′ be the set of ϕ(s, x,a) in L(aa) where a ∈ M and
aas∃xϕ(s, x,a) ∈ T . Define inM ′:
ϕ(s, x,a) ∼ ϕ′(s, x,a′)
if and only if
aas(fϕ(s,x,a)(s) = fϕ′(s,x,a′)(s)) ∈ T.
Note that ∼ is an equivalence relation in M ′. Moreover, if (1) R ∈ τ , (2) the
sentence
aasR(fϕ1(s,x,a1)(s), . . . , fϕn(s,x,an)(s))
is in T , and (3) ϕi(s, x,ai) ∼ ϕ′i(s, x,a
′
i) for i = 1, . . . , n, then we may easily
conclude that aasR(fϕ′
1
(s,x,a′
1
)(s), . . . , fϕ′n(s,x,a′n)(s)) is in T . Thus we can form
the setM∗ of equivalence classes [ϕ(s, x,a)] of ∼ and define inM∗ the interpre-
tation of the predicates R ∈ τ as follows:
RM
∗
([ϕ1(s, x,a1)], . . . , [ϕn(s, x,an)]) ⇐⇒
aasR(fϕ1(s,x,a1)(s), . . . , fϕn(s,x,an)(s)) ∈ T.
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The canonical embedding j : M →M∗ is defined by j(a) = [x = a]. It is clearly
one-one and satisfies
M |= R(a1, . . . , an) ⇐⇒ R(a1, . . . , an) ∈ T
⇐⇒ aasR(fx=a1(s), . . . , fx=an(s)) ∈ T
⇐⇒ M∗ |= R([x = a1], . . . , [x = an])
⇐⇒ M∗ |= R(j(a1), . . . , j(an))
for R ∈ τ .
Definition 5.8. Let τ ∗ = τ ∪ {P ∗}, where P ∗ is a new unary predicate symbol.
We make M∗ a τ ∗-structure by defining (P ∗)M
∗
= {j(a) : a ∈ M}. We let T ∗
consist of
ψ(P ∗, [ϕ1(s, x,a)], . . . , [ϕn(s, x,a)]),
where ψ(s, x1, . . . , xn) is a τ -formula of L(aa), and
aasψ(s, fϕ1(s,x,a)(s), . . . , fϕn(s,x,a)(s)) ∈ T.
Lemma 5.9. The pair (M∗, T ∗) is an aa-premouse with vocabulary τ ∗. It is club
determined if (M,T ) is. The mapping j is an elementary embedding (M,T ) →
(M∗, T ∗) (in the sense of Definition 5.5).
Proof. T ∗ is consistent: Supposeϕi(P
∗, [ϕ1(t, x,a)], . . . , [ϕn(t, x,a)]), i = 1, . . . , m,
is a finite set of sentences in T ∗ such that
m∧
i=1
ϕi(P
∗, [ϕ1(s, x,a)], . . . , [ϕn(s, x,a)]) ⊢ ⊥. (12)
By the definition of T ∗, for i = 1, . . . , m
m∧
i=1
aatϕi(t, fϕ1(t,x,a)(t), . . . , fϕn(t,x,a)(t)) ∈ T,
whence
aat
m∧
i=1
ϕi(t, fϕ1(t,x,a)(t), . . . , fϕn(t,x,a)(t)) ∈ T.
It can be shown by induction on L(aa)-proofs that (12) implies
aat
m∧
i=1
ϕi(t, fϕ1(t,x,a)(t), . . . , fϕn(t,x,a)(t)) ⊢ aas⊥,
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whence aas⊥ ∈ T , contrary to the consistency of T .
T ∗ is complete: This follows immediately from the club determinacy of T .
T ∗ satisfies club determinacy: By Lemma 4.2,
aataasϕ(t, fϕ1(s,x,a)(t), . . . , fϕn(s,x,a)(t)) ∈ T
or
aataas¬ϕ(t, fϕ1(s,x,a)(t), . . . , fϕn(s,x,a)(t)) ∈ T.
Hence
aasϕ(P ∗, [ϕ1(s, x,a)], . . . , [ϕn(s, x,a)]) ∈ T
∗
or
aas¬ϕ(P ∗, [ϕ1(s, x,a)], . . . , [ϕn(s, x,a)]) ∈ T
∗.
Thus T ∗ satisfies club determinacy.
Finally, j is elementary, because
ϕ(a1, . . . , an) ∈ T ⇐⇒ aasϕ(fx=a1(s), . . . , fx=an(s)) ∈ T
⇐⇒ ϕ([x = a1], . . . , [x = an]) ∈ T
∗ ⇐⇒ ϕ(j(a1), . . . , j(an)) ∈ T
∗.
Lemma 5.10. j[M ] 6=M∗.
Proof. We consider [¬x ∈ s] ∈ M∗. Suppose [¬x ∈ s] = j(a) for some a ∈
M , i.e. [¬x ∈ s] = [x = a]. Then aas(f¬x∈s(s) = fx=a(s)) ∈ T , whence
aas(a 6∈ s) ∈ T . But by Axiom (A2) of stationary logic aas(a ∈ s) ∈ T , a
contradiction.
Lemma 5.11.
ψ(P ∗, [ϕ1(s, x,a)], . . . , [ϕn(s, x,a)]) ∈ T
∗
if and only if
aasψ(s, fϕ1(s,x,a)(s), . . . , fϕn(s,x,a)(s)) ∈ T.
Proof. The “if”-part is true by definition. For the “only if”-part, suppose
aasψ(s, fϕ1(s,x,a)(s), . . . , fϕn(s,x,a)(s)) 6∈ T.
Then by club determinacy
aas¬ψ(s, fϕ1(s,x,a)(s), . . . , fϕn(s,x,a)(s)) ∈ T,
whence
¬ψ(P ∗, [ϕ1(s, x,a)], . . . , [ϕn(s, x,a)]) ∈ T
∗,
contrary to the consistency of T ∗.
28
Lemma 5.12. aas∀x(P ∗(x) → s(x)) ∈ T ∗ i.e. P ∗ is “countable” in the sense
of T ∗.
Proof. Clearly, aataas∀x(t(x) → s(x)) ∈ T . Hence by definition 5.8,
aas∀x(P ∗(x)→ s(x)) ∈ T ∗.
The following lemma summarises the basic property of ultrapowers. In our
case it holds trivially because we have built T ∗ in a way which makes it true. The
usual Łos´ Lemma talks about truth in the ultrapower vs. truth in the model. In the
case of an aa-premouse (M,T ) we cannot talk about truth in M , but just about
what the theory T says.
Lemma 5.13 (Łos´ Lemma). Suppose (M,T ) is a club determined aa-premouse
and (M∗, T ∗) is its aa-ultrapower. The following holds forL(aa)-formulasψ(x1, . . . , xn)
in the vocabulary τ ∗:
aasψ(fϕ1(s,x,a1)(s), . . . , fϕn(s,x,an)(s)) ∈ T if and only if
ψ([ϕ1(s, x,a1)], . . . , [ϕn(s, x,an)]) ∈ T
∗.
Proof. The claim follows trivially from Lemma 5.11.
Lemma 5.14. If ∃xψ(P ∗, x, [ϕ1(s, x,a1)], . . . , [ϕn(s, x,an)]) ∈ T ∗, then there is
b ∈M∗ such that ψ(P ∗, b, [ϕ1(s, x,a1)], . . . , [ϕn(s, x,an)]) ∈ T ∗.
Proof. Suppose ∃xψ(P ∗, x, [ϕ1(s, x,a)], . . . , [ϕn(s, x,a)]) ∈ T ∗. By the defini-
tion of T ∗,
aas∃xψ(s, x, fϕ1(s,x,a)(s), . . . , fϕn(s,x,a)(s)) ∈ T.
Hence
aasψ(s, fψ′(s,x,a)(s), fϕ1(s,x,a1)(s), . . . , fϕn(s,x,a)(s)) ∈ T,
where ψ′(s, x,a) is the formula ψ(s, x, fϕ1(s,x,a)(s), . . . , fϕn(s,x,a)(s)). Hence
ψ(P ∗, [ψ′(s, x,a)], [ϕ1(s, x,a)], . . . , [ϕn(s, x,a)]) ∈ T
∗.
Definition 5.15 (The aa-ultrapower). We call the aa-premouse (M∗, T ∗) the aa-
ultrapower of (M,T ).
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Lemma 5.16. Suppose (M,T ) is a countable premouse with vocabulary τ and
π : (M,T )→ (N, ThL(aa)(N))
is an elementary embedding, where N is an expansion of L′α to a τ -structure and
cfV (α) > ω. There are P+ ⊆ L′α and an elementary
π∗ : ((M∗, P ∗), T ∗)→ ((N,P+), ThL(aa)((N,P
+)))
such that π∗(j(a)) = π(a) for all a ∈M .
Proof. Suppose [ϕ(s, x,a)] ∈ M∗. Then aas∃xϕ(s, x,a) ∈ T , whence N |=
aas∃xϕ(s, x, π(a)). Let Ca,ϕ be a club of countable subsets s of L′α such that
N |= ∃xϕ(s, x, π(a)). Let Q be the intersection of the countably many Ca,ϕ
where a ∈M and ϕ ∈ L(aa). Let us fix S ∈ Q. Thus for all a ∈M and ϕ there
is a ≺-least za,ϕ ∈ N such that N |= ϕ(S, za,ϕ, π(a)). We let π∗([ϕ(s, x,a)]) =
za,ϕ and P
+ = S ∩ rng(π∗). Note that we do not require that P+ ∈ C(aa).
Obviously, π∗(j(a)) = π(a) for all a ∈M .
Nowwe prove that π∗ is elementary. SupposeR([ϕ1(s, x,a)], . . . , [ϕm(s, x,a)])
is atomic, R ∈ τ , andM∗ |= R([ϕ1(s, x,a)], . . . , [ϕm(s, x,a)]). Thus
aasR(fϕ1(s,x,a)(s), . . . , fϕn(s,x,a)(s)) ∈ T,
whence
N |= aasR(fϕ1(s,x,π(a))(s), . . . , fϕn(s,x,π(a))(s)).
Hence
N |= R(π∗([ϕ1(s, x, π(a))]), . . . , π
∗([ϕm(s, x, π(a))])).
For the other direction one can use club determinacy.
Suppose then j(a) = [x = a] ∈ P ∗. π∗(j(a)) = π(a). N |= aas(π(a) ∈ s).
Hence π(a) ∈ S. Hence, π∗(j(a)) ∈ P+. Conversely, suppose z ∈ P+.
Let z = π∗(y), where y = [ϕ(s, x,a)]. We show that y ∈ P ∗. We have
N |= aas∃x(ϕ(s, x,a) ∧ x ∈ s). Hence there is b ∈ N such that N |=
aas∃x(ϕ(s, x,a) ∧ x = cb). Since (M,T ) is a premouse, there is such a b in
M . It follows that y = j(b).
The other cases are easy.
Lemma 5.17. Suppose ((Mβ , Tβ), jβγ), β ≤ γ ≤ δ, where δ = ∪δ ≤ ω1, is a
directed system of aa-premice. Let τβ be the vocabulary of (Mβ, Tβ). Suppose
the mappings πβ : (Mβ, Tβ) → (Nβ , ThL(aa)(Nβ)), β < δ, are elementary,
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where Nβ is some expansion of L
′
α to a τβ-structure, such that Nβ = Nγ ↾ τβ and
πβ(x) = πγ(jβγ(x)) for all x ∈Mβ and all β < γ < δ. Then there is an expansion
Nδ of L
′
α to a τδ-structure and an elementary πδ : (Mδ, Tδ)→ (Nδ, ThL(aa)(Nδ))
such that Nβ = Nδ ↾ τβ and πβ(x) = πδ(jβδ(x)) for all x ∈Mβ and all β < δ.
Proof. Obvious.
Suppose (M,T ) has vocabulary τ . Let ((Mα, Tα), jαβ), α ≤ β ≤ ω1, be a
directed system of aa-premice such that
(M0, T0) = (M,T )
(Mα+1, Tα+1) = (M
∗
α, T
∗
α)
(Mν , Tν) = lim−→(Mα, Tα), limit ν.
The vocabulary τα ofMα consists of τ and the unary predicate symbols Pβ, β <
α. The mappings jαβ of the directed system are elementary embeddings jαβ :
(Mα, Tα) → (Mβ ↾ τα, Tβ), α < β ≤ ω1, such that jαα+1 is always the canonical
embedding.
Lemma 5.18. The interpretations of the unary predicates {Pα : α < ω1} inMω1
form a club in Pω1(Mω1).
Proof. Let C = {P
Mω1
α : α < ω1}. Since we take direct limits at limits, this
sequence is continuous. By Lemma 5.10 it is properly increasing. Any countable
subset s of Mω1 is in the iαω1-image of Mα for some α. Since Mα+1 = M
∗
α, the
set s is included in P
Mω1
α+1 .
Definition 5.19. We call the aa-premice (Mα, Tα) iterates of (M,T ). An aa-
premouse (M,T ) is an aa-mouse if its iterates (Mα, Tα), α < ω1, are all well-
founded. In this case we say that the aa-premouse (M,T ) is iterable.
Lemma 5.20. Suppose
(M,T ) 4 (L′α, ThL(aa)(L
′
α)),
where cf(α) > ω. Then (M,T ) is a club determined aa-mouse.
Proof. If (M,T ) is as in Example 5.6, we may use Lemmas 5.16 and 5.17 induc-
tively to build
πβ : (Mβ, Tβ)→ (Nβ,ThL(aa)(Nβ))
for all β ≤ ω1, where each Nα is an expansion of L′β , with the consequence that
eachMβ is well-founded.
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Proposition 5.21. Suppose (M,T ) is a countable aa-mouse and (Mω1 , Tω1) is its
ω1’st iterate. Then
aasϕ(s,a) ∈ Tω1 ⇐⇒ Mω1 |= aasϕ(s,a).
Proof. We prove the claim by induction on ϕ(a). Let β be the least β such that
a ∈Mβ.
1. Atomic ϕ(s,a): Suppose aas1 . . .aasnϕ(s,a) ∈ Tω1 . By club determinacy,
aas1 . . .aasnϕ(s,a) ∈ Tβ, whence aas1 . . .aasnϕ(s,a) ∈ Tγ for β ≤ γ < ω1.
Therefore aas2 . . .aasnϕ(Pγ, s2, . . . , sn,a) ∈ Tγ+1 for β ≤ γ < ω1. Further-
more, by construction, ϕ(Pγ1, . . . , Pγn ,a) ∈ Tω1 for β ≤ γ1 < . . . < γn < ω1.
Since ϕ(s,a) is atomic,Mω1 |= ϕ(Pγ1, . . . , Pγn ,a) for all β ≤ γ1 < . . . < γn <
ω1. By Lemma 5.18, Mω1 |= aasϕ(s,a). Conversely, if aasϕ(s,a) /∈ Tβ , then
aas¬ϕ(s,a) ∈ Tβ and we can argue as above.
2. Conjunction: Suppose aas(ϕ(s,a) ∧ ψ(s,a)) ∈ Tω1 . Then aasϕ(s,a) ∈
Tω1 and aasψ(s,a) ∈ Tω1 . By Induction Hypothesis, Mω1 |= aas(ϕ(s,a) ∧
ψ(s,a)).
3. Negation: Easy, by club determinacy.
4. Existential quantifier: Suppose aas∃xϕ(s, x,a) ∈ Tβ. Then
aasϕ(s, fϕ(s,x,a)(s),a) ∈ Tβ.
By the Induction Hypothesis, Mω1 |= aasϕ(s, fϕ(s,x,a)(s),a). Hence we have
Mω1 |= aas∃xϕ(s, x,a). The converse follows by Case 3.
5. The aa-quantifier: We show aasaatϕ(s, t,a) ∈ Tω1 if and only if Mω1 |=
aasaatϕ(s, t,a). This follows from the Induction Hypothesis, since we can com-
bine s and t into one finite sequence of variables.
5.3.3 The Continuum Hypothesis in C(aa)
Lemma 5.22. Suppose (M0, T0) ≺ (L
′
α, ThL(aa)(L
′
α)), α limit, and club deter-
minacy holds. Then (Mω1 , Tω1) does not have new reals over those in (M0, T0).
Proof. Suppose r is a real in Mω1 . Let ξ < ω1 such that r ∈ Mξ+1 \Mξ. Then
r = [ϕ(s, x,a)] for some ϕ(s, x,y) ∈ L(aa) and some a ∈ Mξ such that
aas∃xϕ(s, x,a) ∈ Tξ. In particular, Mω1 |= aas∃xϕ(s, x,a). Since Mω1 |=
“[ϕ(s, x,a)] ⊆ ω”, the sentence ∃x(x ⊆ ω ∧∀n(n ∈ [ϕ(s, x,a)]↔ n ∈ x)) is in
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Tω1 , whence aas∃x(x ⊆ ω ∧ ∀n(n ∈ fϕ(s,x,a)(s) ↔ n ∈ x)) is in Tξ and there-
fore true in L′α. So there is a club of sets s such that L
′
α |= ∃x(x ⊆ ω ∧ ∀n(n ∈
fϕ(s,x,a)(s) ↔ n ∈ x)). Since L′α has only countably many reals (a consequence
of club determinacy, see Theorem 5.1), this club is divided into countably many
parts according to the x ⊆ ω such that L′α |= ∀n(n ∈ fϕ(s,x,a)(s)↔ n ∈ x). One
of those parts is stationary and therefore, by club determinacy, contains a club.
Hence ∃xaas(x ⊆ ω ∧ ∀n(n ∈ fϕ(s,x,a)(s)↔ n ∈ x)) is in Tξ. Since (Mξ, Tξ) is
an aa-mouse, there is b ∈ Mξ such that aas(b ⊆ ω ∧ ∀n(n ∈ fϕ(s,x,a)(s) ↔ n ∈
b)) is in Tξ. Hence aas(b ⊆ ω ∧ ∀n(n ∈ fϕ(s,x,a)(s)↔ n ∈ b)) is true in L′α, and
therefore r = b, a contradiction.
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section:
Theorem 5.23. If club determinacy holds, then CH holds in C(aa).
Proof. Since we assume club determinacy, there are only countably many reals in
C(aa), but we show that there are, in the sense of C(aa), only ℵC(aa)1 many. The
ordinal ℵC(aa)1 is in our case a countable ordinal in the sense of V .
Suppose L′α is a stage where a new real r of C(aa) is constructed, i.e.
r ∈ L′α+1 \ L
′
α. (13)
We show that L′α ∩ 2
ω is countable in C(aa). It follows that C(aa) ∩ 2ω has
cardinality ℵ1 in C(aa). Hence C(aa) |= CH .
We can collapse |α| to ℵ1 without changing C(aa) or C(aa) ∩ 2ω. Also club
determinacy is preserved in this forcing, because the forcing is countably closed.
Therefore we can assume, w.l.o.g., that |α| = ℵ1.
Let (M,T ) ∈ C(aa) be countable in C(aa) such that
{r, α, L′α} ⊆ (M,T ) 4 (L
′
ℵV
2
,ThL(aa)(L
′
ℵV
2
)). (14)
So now
r ∈ (L′α+1)
M \ (L′α)
M . (15)
The idea of the rest of the proof is the following. We iterate (M,T ) until we obtain
(Mω1 , Tω1). We show that (L
′
α)
Mω1 = L′α, whence L
′
α ∩ 2
ω ⊆ Mω1 . Lemma 5.22
implies Mω1 ∩ 2
ω ⊆ M. It follows that L′α ∩ 2
ω is countable, as we wished to
demonstrate.
In more details, let (Mξ, Tξ), iξη, ξ < η ≤ ω1 be the iteration of (M,T ) as
defined above. The modelsMξ are well-founded and collapse to transitive models
Nξ with elementary embeddings jξη : Nξ → Nη, as in Figure 1.
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i01 i12 iξξ+1
M0 → M1 → M2 . . . → Mξ → Mξ+1 . . . Mω1
π0 ↓ π1 ↓ π2 ↓ πξ ↓ πξ+1 ↓ πω1 ↓
N0 → N1 → N2 . . . → Nξ → Nξ+1 . . . Nω1
j01 j12 jξξ+1
Figure 1: The iteration.
By Lemma 5.22, no new reals are generated in the iteration. By Lemma 5.21,
the model Nω1 is correct about the aa-quantifier. Thus if the hierarchy L
′
β of the
C(aa)-model is built inside Nω1 , then we obtain for all β ∈ Nω1 the result:
L′β = (L
′
β)
Nω1 . (16)
Combining this with (13) and (15) yields,
r = j0ω1(π0(r))
∈ j0ω1(π0((L
′
α+1)
M0)) \ j0ω1(π0((L
′
α)
M0)
= (L′j0ω1 (π0(α))+1
)Nω1 \ (L′j0ω1π0(α))
)Nω1
= L′j0ω1 (π0(α))+1
\ L′j0ω1π0(α))
.
By (13), j0ω1(π0(α)) = α ∈ Nω1 and further by (16), j0ω1(π0(L
′
α)) = L
′
α. Thus
all the reals of L′α are in Nω1 and hence in M , and they are countably many
only.
The above proof shows that C(aa) |= 2ℵα = ℵα+1 for all α ≤ ω1(= ωV1 ). For
α < ω1 the above proof works, and for α = ω1 the claim therefore follows from
the fact (Theorem 5.1) that ω1 is measurable in C(aa).
Theorem 5.24. If club determinacy holds, there is a∆13 well-ordering of the reals
in C(aa).
Proof. We show that the canonical well-order ≺ of C(aa) is ∆13. The proof of
Theorem 5.23 essentially shows that for any reals x, y in C(aa):
x ≺ y ⇐⇒ ∃z ⊆ ω( z codes an aa-mouseM such that
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x, y ∈M andM |= “x ≺ y”).
Being a real that codes a countable aa-mouse is Π12. Hence the right hand side of
the equivalence is Σ13 and the claim follows.
Corollary 5.25. If club determinacy holds, there are no Woodin cardinals in
C(aa).
Proof. The proof of Theorem 5.24 shows that, assuming club determinacy, there is
a ∆13-well-ordering of the reals, this well-ordering is in C(aa) and ∆
1
3 in C(aa).
Suppose there is a Woodin cardinal in C(aa). There would be a measurable
cardinal above it by Theorem 5.1. A measurable cardinal above aWoodin cardinal
implies Σ12-determinacy ([10]). On the other hand, Σ
1
2-determinacy implies that
Σ13-sets are Lebesgue measurable which contradicts the existence of a Σ
1
3-well-
ordering.
Theorem 5.26. If club determinacy holds for C(aa), then✸ holds in C(aa).
Proof. Let ωaa1 denote the ω1 of C(aa). We define Sα for α < ω
aa
1 as follows:
Let (C,X) be the ≺C(aa)-minimal pair (C,X), where C ⊆ α is a club and
X ∩ Sβ 6= Sβ for β ∈ C. We then let Sα = X . Suppose S = 〈Sα : α < ωaa1 〉 is
not a✸-sequence in C(aa). Then there areX ⊆ ωaa1 and a club C ∈ C(aa) such
that C ⊆ ωaa1 and β ∈ C implies X ∩ β 6= Sβ. Let δ be minimal such that such
a pair can be found in L′δ. W.l.o.g., δ < ℵ
V
2 . Let (M,T ) ∈ C(aa) be countable
such that
{S, δ, L′δ} ⊆ (M,T ) ≺ (L
′
ℵV
2
,ThL(aa)(L
′
ℵV
2
)). (17)
We build modelsMξ andNξ as well as elementary mappings iαβ , jαβ and isomor-
phisms πα for α < β ∈ Nω1 withM0 = M as in the proof of Theorem 5.23. Let
α = M ∩ ωaa1 , C¯ = C ∩ α and X¯ = X ∩ α. Let δ
∗ = j0ω1(π0(δ)). The ordinal
δ∗ is the minimal δ∗ such that there is a counterexample such as (C¯, X¯) in L′δ∗ in
Nω1 . The ordinal α is below the critical point of j01, whence
j0ω1(〈Sβ : β < α〉) = 〈Sβ : β < α〉.
Therefore, according to our definition, Sα = (C¯, X¯), contradicting α ∈ C.
6 Variants of stationary logic
There are several variants of stationary logic. The earliest variant is based on the
following quantifier introduced in [12], a predecessor of the quantifier aa:
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Definition 6.1. M |= QStxyzϕ(x,a)ψ(y, z,a) if and only if (M0, R0), where
M0 = {b ∈ M : M |= ϕ(b,a)} and R0 = {(b, c) ∈ M : M |= ψ(b, c,a)} is
an ℵ1-like linear order and the set I of initial segments of (M0, R0) with an R0-
supremum inM0 is stationary in the setD of all (countable) initial segments ofM0
in the following sense: If J ⊆ D is unbounded inD (i.e. ∀x ∈ D∃y ∈ J (x ⊆ y))
and σ-closed in D (i.e. if x0 ⊆ x1 ⊆ . . . in J , then
⋃
n xn ∈ J ), then J ∩ I 6= ∅.
The logic L(QSt), a sublogic of L(aa), is recursively axiomatizable and ℵ0-
compact [12]. We call this logic Shelah’s stationary logic, and denote C(L(QSt))
by C(aa−). For example, we can say in the logic L(QSt) that a formula ϕ(x)
defines a stationary (in V ) subset of ω1 in a transitive model M containing ω1 as
an element as follows:
M |= ∀x(ϕ(x)→ x ∈ ω1) ∧Q
Stxyzϕ(x)(ϕ(y) ∧ ϕ(z) ∧ y ∈ z).
Hence
C(aa−) ∩ Fω1 ∈ C(aa
−)
and in fact the set D = C(aa−) ∩Fω1 , where Fω1 is the club-filter on ω1, suffices
to characterise C(aa−) completely: C(aa−) = L[D]. In particular, C(aa−) ⊆
C(aa).
Theorem 6.2. If there are two Woodin cardinals, then C(aa−) = L[D], where
D = C(aa−) ∩ Fω1 is an ultrafilter in C(aa
−). In particular, C(aa−) |= GCH .
Proof. We know C(aa−) = L[Fω1 ]. We show that D = Fω1 ∩ C(aa
−) measures
every set in C(aa−). Let us assume the contrary. We take a minimal α such
that there is a set B ⊆ ω1 in L′α (the hierarchy generating C(aa
−)) such that
B /∈ D and ωV1 \ B /∈ D. The logic L(aa
−) satisfies a Downward Lo¨wenheim
Skolem Tarski Theorem down to ℵ1 ([12]). Hence, as in Lemma 4.18, |α| ≤ ℵ1.
As in the beginning of the proof of Theorem 4.12, we can assume, w.l.o.g., that
δ12 = ω2 and we have still one Woodin cardinal δ left. Let G be Q<δ-generic and
j : V → M ⊆ V [G] the generic ultrapower embedding. Let j(α) = β. Now
j(B) is a stationary co-stationary subset of δ (= ωM1 ) in M . Moreover, β is the
minimal ordinal for which there is such a set in L′β in M , and the definition of
j(B) in L(aa−) is minimal for such a set. As in the proof of Theorem 4.12 we can
now argue that j(B) ∈ V . We get a contradiction by taking two different generic
sets for Q<δ, one containing B and the other containing ω1 \B.
Proposition 6.3. If 0# exists, then 0# ∈ C(aa−).
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Proof. Assume 0♯. A first order formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) holds in L for an increas-
ing sequence of indiscernibles below ωV1 if and only if there is a club C of ordi-
nals < ωV1 such that every increasing sequence a1 < . . . < an from C satisfies
ϕ(a1, . . . , an) in L. Similarly, ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) does not hold in L for an increas-
ing sequence of indiscernibles below ωV1 if and only if there is a club of ordi-
nals a1 < ω1 such that there ia a club of ordinals a2 with a1 < a2 < ω1 such
that . . . such that there is a club of ordinals an with an−1 < an < ω1 satisfying
¬ϕ(a1, . . . , an). From this it follows that 0
# ∈ C(aa−).
Theorem 6.4. It is consistent relative to the consistency of ZFC that
C∗ * C(aa−) ∧ C(aa−) * C∗.
Proof. We force over L and first we add two Cohen reals r0 and r1, to obtain V1.
Now we use modified Namba forcing to make cf(ℵLn+1) = ω if and only if n ∈ r0.
This forcing satisfies the S-condition (see [7]), and therefore will not—by [4]—
kill the stationarity of any stationary subset of ω1. The argument is essentially
the same as for Namba forcing. Let the extension of V1 by P be V2. In V2 we
have C(aa−) = L because we have not changed stationary subsets of ω1. But
V2 |= r0 ∈ C∗.
Let Sn, n < ω, be in L a definable sequence of disjoint stationary subsets of
ω1 such that
⋃
n Sn = ω1. Working in V2, we use the canonical forcing notion
which kills the stationarity of Sn if and only if n ∈ r1. Let the resulting model
be V3. The cofinalities of ordinals are the same in V2 and V3, whence (C
∗)V2 is
the same as (C∗)V3 . Thus V3 |= r1 ∈ C(aa−) \ C∗. Now we argue that V3 |=
C(aa−) = L(r1). First of all, L(r1) ⊆ C(aa
−) by the construction of V3. Next
we prove by induction on the construction of C(aa−) as a hierarchy L′α, α ∈ On,
that L′α ⊆ L(r1). When we consider L
′
α+1 and assume L
′
α ⊆ L(r1), we have to
decide whether a subset S of ω1, constructible from r1, is stationary or not. The
set S is stationary in V3 if and only if it is stationary in L(r1) and it is not included
modulo the club filter in
⋃
n∈r1
Sn. Thus L
′
α+1 ⊆ L(r1).
In V3 the real r0 is in C
∗ \ C(aa−) and the real r1 is in C(aa−) \ C∗.
The logics L(Qcfω ), giving rise to C
∗, and L(aa−), giving rise to C(aa−), are
two important logics, both introduced by Shelah. Since L(Qcfω ) is fully compact,
L(aa−) cannot be a sub-logic of it. On the other hand, it is well-known and easy
to show that L(Qcfω ) is a sub-logic of L(aa). Therefore it is interesting to note the
following corollary to the above theorem:
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Corollary 6.5. It is consistent, relative to the consistency of ZFC, that L(Qcfω ) *
L(QSt) and hence L(QSt) 6= L(aa).
We do not knowwhether it is consistent thatL(Qcfω ) ⊆ L(aa
−) or thatL(aa−) =
L(aa).
A modification of C(aa−) is the following C(aa0):
Definition 6.6. M |= QSt,0xyzuϕ(x, y,a)ψ(u,a) if and only ifM0 = {(b, c) ∈
M : M |= ϕ(b, c,a)} is a linear order of cofinality ω1 and every club of initial
segments has an element with supremum in R0 = {b ∈ M :M |= ψ(b,a)}. The
inner model C(aa0) is defined as C(L(QSt,0)).
Proposition 6.7. If there are two Woodin cardinals, then C(aa0) |= “ℵV1 is a
measurable cardinal”.
Proof. The proof of this is—mutatis mutandis—as the proof for C(aa−).
Proposition 6.8. If 0† exists, then 0† ∈ C(aa0).
Proof. Assume 0†. There is a club class of indiscernibles for the inner model
L[U ] where U is (in L[U ]) a normal measure on an ordinal δ. Let us choose an
indiscernible α above δ of V -cofinality ωV1 . We can define 0
† as follows: An in-
creasing sequence of indiscernibles satisfies a given formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) if and
only if there is a club C of ordinals below α such that every increasing sequence
a1 < . . . < an from C satisfies ϕ(a1, . . . , an) in L[U ]. Similarly, ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)
does not hold in L[U ] for an increasing sequence of indiscernibles below α if and
only if there is a club of ordinals a1 < α such that there is a club of ordinals
a2 with a1 < a2 < α such that . . . such that there is a club of ordinals an with
an−1 < an < α satisfying ¬ϕ(a1, . . . , an). From this it follows that 0† ∈ C(aa0).
Corollary 6.9. If there are two Woodin cardinals, then C(aa−) 6= C(aa0). Then
also the logics L(QSt) and L(QSt,0) are non-equivalent.
Proof. If there are two Woodin cardinals, then then 0† exists and C(aa−) does not
contain 0† by Theorem 6.2, while C(aa0) does contain by Proposition 6.8.
Note that it is probably possible to prove the non-equivalence of the logics
L(QSt) and L(QSt,0) in ZFC with a model theoretic argument using the exact
definitions of the logics and by choosing the structures very carefully. But the non-
equivalence result given by the above Corollary is quite robust in the sense that
it is not at all sensitive to the exact definitions of the logics as long as the central
separating feature, manifested in structures of the form (α,<), is respected.
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7 Open problems
There are many open questions about C(aa). We list here the some of the most
prominent ones:
1. Is GCH true in C(aa) under the assumption of large cardinals?
2. Are singular cardinals of V measurable in C(aa) under the assumption of
large cardinals?
3. Do regular cardinals of V have stronger large cardinal properties in C(aa)
than measurability, under the assumption of large cardinals?
4. Does C(aa) 6= C∗ follow from large cardinal assumptions?
5. What is the consistency strength of club determinacy?
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